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Abstract 
Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History (hereafter LPH) has been often hailed as 
his most accessible work. I wish to argue that, even if it were at one point in time the best 
entrée to Hegel's thought, it is no longer. More specifically, I argue that the claim that it 
is still his most accessible work needs retooling. To do this, I have set up three criteria for 
what it means for a work to be accessible: authenticity, self-containedness, and 
navigability. The criterion of authenticity simply states that the more authorial integrity a 
work has, the more accessible it is; that of self-containedness demands that a work be 
relatively understandable in itself; and that of navigability demands that an accessible 
work help the reader navigate in further studies of the same author.  
The argumentative section of the paper is structured according to these criteria. 
The first section considers the text of the LPH itself and the criterion of authenticity. Here 
we see that the text of the LPH has a peculiar, varied textual tradition, both in its German 
and English editions. The second section considers the secondary literature on the LPH 
and the criterion of self-containedness. Here we find that the commentators regularly feel 
the need to go outside the LPH to make even the basic content of the LPH 
understandable. The final section considers the wider corpus of Hegel scholarship, 
specifically his metaphysics, and the criterion of navigability. Does the LPH help us 
resolve, or even slightly clarify, perennially thorny tensions in Hegel scholarship like his 
metaphysics? I will argue that this is unlikely. Thus overall we conclude that the claim 
that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work is indeed in need of qualification. 
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Introduction 
G. W. F. Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History (hereafter LPH) has been 
often hailed as Hegel's most accessible work. The back cover of one edition readers: 
"Hegel himself seems to have regarded [the LPH] as a popular introduction to his 
philosophy as a whole" and as "the most readable and accessible of all his philosophical 
writings."1 One scholar says that "Hegel himself opined that these Vorlesungen [Ger. 
'lectures'] were the best popular introduction to his philosophy."2 Another scholar 
declares that "his most accessible work is Reason in History."3 Still another scholar says 
that the "best place to begin reading Hegel . . . is with the lectures on aesthetics or the 
philosophy of history" since they are "relatively accessible" and "perceptive and thought-
provoking."4 Most of the time this claim is merely asserted, and those who do try to argue 
it normally point to its readability or its emphasis on history. Moreover, that Hegel 
himself seems to have considered the LPH a good entrée into his thought makes it seem 
quite impious to think otherwise. Yet while it may be Hegel's most readable work and it 
surely emphasizes history, I want to argue that, even if it were at one point the best entrée 
to Hegel's thought, it is no longer, or, more specifically: the claim that it still is needs 
retooling.  
To argue such a claim, I have first to set up some criteria for what it means for a 
work to be accessible. I have chosen three: authenticity, self-containedness, and 
                                                 
1. From the back of Nisbet's translation of Hoffmeister's critical German edition. 
2. Leonard Krieger, Ideas and Events: Professing History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 
56. 
3. Larry Johnston, Ideologies: An Analytic and Contextual Approach (Petersborough: Broadview 
Press, 1996), 78. 
4. Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, 2d ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2005): 300. 
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navigability. While I have not the space to explicate the theoretical underpinnings of each 
of these criteria, I will briefly explain each one, hoping that they will resonate somewhat 
intuitively with the reader. The criterion of authenticity states that a work must have a 
high degree of textual integrity, particularly by having a confirmed origin of authorship; 
and the higher its degree of integrity, the more accessible it is. This is so because the 
more certain we are that a given author wrote the work at hand, the more certain we can 
be that it is representative; and that a work well represents its author seems desirable in 
an accessible work. The criterion of self-containedness demands that a work be relatively 
understandable in and of itself. It must be like a movement in a great symphony: distinct 
from the other movements yet somehow dependent for its theme, not full of the glory of 
the whole piece itself but containing some resemblance of that glory. Thus, the more a 
work requires the aid of outside works in order to be understood, the less accessible it is.5 
The criterion of navigability, borrowing a nautical metaphor, demands that once a person 
has read an accessible work, it will have been preparatory for understanding further 
works by that same author; it will help to navigate in further studies. The less a work 
helps the reader navigate, the less accessible it is.  
Thus, having set these criteria in place, we proceed now to consider each three 
correlative aspects of the claim that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work. The first 
aspect is that of the text of the LPH itself. Does this aspect meet satisfactorily the 
correlative criterion of authenticity? The second aspect is that of the secondary literature 
on the LPH. Does the secondary literature vindicate its self-containedness or does it 
demonstrate the need to consult other works in order to understand it? The third aspect is 
                                                 
5. This is not to say that an accessible work need be comprehensive but only that it be an 
understandable work in and of itself. 
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that of the wider corpus of Hegel scholarship. Does the LPH, in light of the wider corpus 
of Hegel scholarship, help the reader satisfactorily navigate that wider corpus? These 
aspects and these questions will be the substance of this thesis.  
 A few more preliminaries are in order. First, I have tried at all times to 
differentiate those criticisms of the LPH which claim that it is not self-contained, not 
accessible, etc. from those which claim that it is not a fundamental source for Hegel's 
mature philosophy; for it is only the former in which I am interested, and to confuse the 
latter for the former would sully the results of my research. In addition, it would be good 
for me to make it explicit that my primary concern here is methodological, not exegetical, 
even though it is about the LPH; and this is a good thing, because I am no Hegel scholar, 
and I claim no in-depth familiarity with even some of the most central Hegel writings. 
So, while there may be a monograph or tome my ignorance of which compromises my 
conclusions, I am inclined to believe otherwise, and I have sought to avoid this by 
copious reference to those whose knowledgeability far exceeds mine.  
Finally, a few words on limitations and delimitations. First, the space restrictions 
for this thesis required that I be selective in my use of resources. Though I tried to consult 
as many resources as possible, each new source sometimes resulted in the discovery of 
half a dozen other resources that would ultimately be left untapped. I did my best, 
however, to include those resources that seemed to be well-established, oft-referenced 
works. Any failure to include what others may deem as important sources is strictly my 
fault and is not, by their exclusion, my commentary on their worth. I am more convinced 
now than ever that the process of learning—especially learning about Hegel—never ends.  
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The Criterion of Authenticity: the Text of the LPH 
 
What follows in this section is a discussion of the various German editions of the 
LPH and their respective English translations, after which I shall argue that the claim that 
the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work is in need of qualifying. This overview will also 
help us throughout insofar as it shows in more detail with what texts we have to do.  
The LPH has had no fewer than four German editions. Eduard Gans, the first 
editor and Hegel's close friend and colleague, had as his aim the transformation of 
Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history into a popularly accessible book. Thus Gans' 
edition, published in 1837, made use of Hegel's manuscripts and his students' notes only 
from Hegel's last and most popular offering of the course, that of the winter term of 
1830–31 in Berlin. In addition, Gans made significant alterations to the text, turning 
Hegel's less-structured, punctuated style into more readable, elegant prose. In 1840, just 
three years later, Hegel's son Karl published a second edition, in the Preface to which he 
praised Gans' pioneering but limited efforts and justified the new edition by referencing 
the incorporation of a vast amount of new material, from both Hegel and Hegel's students 
and from earlier offerings of the course. It was Karl Hegel's edition that would prove to 
be the authoritative German text for the LPH until the early twentieth century, when the 
third edition, done by Georg Lasson, was published. This third edition made several 
significant contributions, the first being the incorporation of a valuable and theretofore 
ignored manuscript of Hegel's own; the second, the undoing of Gans' and Karl Hegel's 
altering and restructuring, returning to a more faithful though less readable and appealing 
format; and the third, the addition of a technical feature that distinguished Hegel's own 
work from his students by setting the former in italics and the latter in Roman type. Most 
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significant, however, is the 1955 critical edition of Johannes Hoffmeister, which 
furthered Lasson's critical work through a variety of organizational revisions of the work 
based again on newly discovered manuscripts of Hegel's. According to Hoffmeister in the 
preface to his edition, Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history could now be pieced 
together based almost solely on Hegel's own manuscripts, though Hoffmeister still 
included supplementary material from Hegel's students. What we see then in the German 
editions available is that, with the discovery of new source material and an increased 
sensitivity to properly differentiating Hegel himself from his students, the German 
editions upon which the LPH are based have become increasingly judicious.6 
But it is the English translations in which we are most interested, and it is here 
that our task becomes perceptibly more difficult, for the translations are great not only in 
number but also in variety. That is, not only are there several different translators, each 
with their own methodology and intent, but many of them have translated only selected 
sections of the different German editions. Thus, the first English translation, by J. Sibree, 
appeared in 1857 and was based on Karl Hegel's 1840 German edition.7 Sibree's work 
was entire: it included both the more famous and theoretical Introduction to the lectures 
and also the impressively lengthy survey of world-history. To date, the LPH in its entirety 
appears in English only in Sibree's translation and so, lacking competition, Sibree's 
translation increased in popularity as Hegel was introduced to the English-speaking 
                                                 
6. For more information on the history of the text of the LPH, see Joseph McCarney, Hegel on 
History (New York: Routledge, 2000), 7–10. For even more details, cf. Karl Hegel's Preface to his edition 
of G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Mineola: Dover, 1956, repr. 2004), xvii–xix 
(hereafter 'Sibree'); C. J. Friedrich's introduction to Sibree, iii–vii; Nisbet's preface to G. W. F. Hegel, 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World-History. Introduction: Reason in History, trans. H. B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), xxxvii–xxxviii (hereafter 'Nisbet'); and Lasson's 'Note on 
the Composition of the Text' in Nisbet, 221–226. 
7. Cf. Sibree's introduction, ix–xv. 
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world. Then in 1953, Robert S. Hartman translated into more modern prose just the 
Introduction to the lectures and entitled it Reason in History (after the German title Die 
Vernunft in der Geschichte).8 Despite the publication of Lasson's 1920 critical edition, 
Hartman based his work on the same German edition as Sibree's translation, that of Karl 
Hegel. It was not until 1975 that Hoffmeister's critical German edition—and here only 
the Introduction—was translated into English, this time by H. B. Nisbet. In 1988, Leo 
Rauch produced another English translation based on Karl Hegel's edition, this one 
containing just the Introduction, as well as an appendix containing several sections of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right.9 While this survey does not exhaust the English translations 
of the LPH, it does include the most well-known and widely-used ones and is sufficient 
to show that the lot is varied indeed. 
Scholarly discussion of the merits of each translation over against the others has 
not been insignificant and is something to which LPH commentators have grown 
accustomed. And while the issue here with editions and translations is really much too 
thorny and far too specialized to be given thorough treatment in this paper, a quick 
glimpse at the issue should, and can be, safely made. Moreover, I argue, a glimpse at this 
issue will reveal the LPH's checkered textual tradition, thus diminishing its accessibility, 
and so, demanding a qualification of the claim at hand. Now, normally, if there is 
discussion of the relative merits of the translations at all, it begins by doing what we have 
started to do already, that is, by tracing the development of the text of the LPH. Only 
                                                 
8. See Hartman's preface to G. W. F. Hegel, Reason in History, trans. R. S. Hartman (Upper 
Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1953), v–vi (hereafter 'Hartman'); and Hartman's introduction, ix–xl. 
9. G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, trans. L. Rauch (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1988). It is commonly held that Hegel's Philosophy of Right is a helpful 
propaedeutic to the LPH, hence its inclusion in Rauch's translation.  
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after such a survey is it pointed out that the new, critical editions are superior to 
translations based on earlier German editions, like Gans' or K. Hegel's, which are 
thoroughly fragmented and incomplete.10 For instance, by 1955, when J. Hoffmeister 
published his edition, two manuscripts written by Hegel himself had been found, one in a 
museum and the other in a private residence in Zurich.11 The additions to the text made 
by these new discoveries were not insubstantial either; thus, it became increasingly clear 
that the earlier editions were inferior. But the claim is made not only that earlier editions 
were inferior inasmuch as they lacked material that was only made available later, but 
also that the editing and organizing of what sources the editors did have was itself 
inferior. As Lasson points out in a 'Note on the Composition of the Text' in his critical 
edition, the previous editors, namely Gans and Karl Hegel, either failed to read closely 
and slowly the texts they were compiling and editing, and so, made egregious editorial 
errors, or they were simply unprincipled and failed to meet the standards of philological 
rigor that would have been taken for granted in Lasson's day.12 We have not the space to 
expatiate upon these discrepancies here, but we can safely conclude that, whether the 
editors made mistakes or had low standards, the earlier editions are inferior: it is clear 
that the new, critical editions are superior texts. This means also that English translations 
                                                 
10. See, for instance, Shlomo Avineri, "The Problem of War in Hegel's Thought" in J. Stewart 
(ed.) The Hegel Myths and Legends (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 140; and Shlomo 
Avineri, "Hegel and Nationalism" in J. Stewart (ed.) The Hegel Myths and Legends (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1996), 125. 
11. See Nisbet, 8.  
12. For example, Lasson mentions Hegel's idiosyncratic use of the comparative construction, 
which Gans and Hegel never noticed, thus blunting Hegel's point (Nisbet 22). In addition, Lasson notes the 
frequent incorrect readings done by Gans and K. Hegel, the most distorting of which is their substitution of 
Hegel's Autoritäten ('authorities') for Aprioritäten ('a priori inventions'). Again, Gans and K. Hegel left out 
many of Hegel's marginal comments which added explanatory insight to the text they commented upon. 
Thus, reasons Lasson, if the editors' handling of Hegel himself inspires so little confidence, how much less 
confidence must their handling of Hegel's students' lecture notes inspire?  
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based on the earlier editions can be characterized, too, as fragmented, incomplete, and 
thus inferior. Given the LPH's textual tradition—a checkered one indeed—what will this 
mean for the claim that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work?  
It is not altogether obvious that the varied quality of the English translations of the 
LPH would require a qualification of the claim at hand. After all, textual problems 
notwithstanding, the denseness and heaviness of Hegel's other work contrasts with the 
lighter and more lucid LPH such that all parties would likely consider it refreshing.13 
Moreover, most commentators on Hegel's philosophy of history do not see the abundant 
textual variation in the available versions of the LPH as creating an appreciable amount 
of philosophical variation among them.14 In this regard, whether one is reading Sibree or 
Nisbet is not as important as the fact the Hegel has the tendency in any English 
translation to produce a fairly consistent effect in his reader, normally something like 
bewilderment. Hence, even if there are minor variations in the different translations, the 
same general philosophical content is transmitted relatively faithfully. In fact, many 
authors, while only indirectly treating but still referencing Hegel's philosophy of history, 
mix and match the various translations of the LPH. More specifically, Nisbet's translation 
is most often consulted for the Introduction to the lectures, while Sibree's translation, 
only for its substantial historical survey. It would seem, then, that competent scholarship 
                                                 
13. This is probably one reason why the LPH is such a popular entrée to Hegel. 
14. For instance, see G. D. O'Brien, Hegel on Reason and History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), 6; W. H. Walsh, "Principle and Prejudice in Hegel's Philosophy of History" in Z. A. 
Pelczynski (ed.) Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), 181; McCarney, 7–8; B. T. Wilkins, Hegel's Philosophy of History (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), 18. C. J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Random House, 
1954), 2, seems to indicate that a reliance on Sibree is unwise, but then he claims in the preface to Sibree, 
iv, that neglecting the new insights offered by Hoffmeister's translation will not impair a student's ability to 
catch Hegel's vision.  
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can be done without apprehensions about the text of the LPH. If this is so, do 
considerations of the text of the LPH really make it necessary to qualify the claim that the 
LPH is Hegel's most accessible work? 
Yes, in fact. Remember that in discussing the nature of the text of the LPH, I am 
not arguing that scholarship which consults the earlier, inferior editions of the LPH is 
irreparably tainted, and so, somehow substandard. As we have seen, this is quite clearly 
not the case. Rather, the discussion of the history of the text lays the groundwork for 
evaluating the claim of the LPH's superior accessibility. To substantiate my argument that 
the claim requires qualification, one must consider what it would be like for one to begin 
studying Hegel on the unqualified notion that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work. 
For simplicity's sake, we will discuss only the translations of Sibree and Nisbet.15 
Therefore, suppose that a student buys Sibree's translation, the greatest merit of which is 
its inclusion of the voluminous world-historical survey (since no other English translation 
of the survey exists). Incarnating, so to speak, the seemingly abstract, metaphysical 
content of the more famous Introduction, the survey is essential to maintaining the claim 
that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work. Unfortunately, the Introduction, which is 
typically the part in which scholars are most interested (hence all the translations of just 
the Introduction), has now been shown to lack a substantial amount of material from 
Hegel's own hand in Sibree's version. But what Sibree lacks, Nisbet has. Without a doubt, 
then, Nisbet's is the superior text, but only of the Introduction. Suppose instead, then, that 
the student buys Nisbet's translation. In this scenario, the student is able to read the best, 
because most critical, English translation of the Introduction to the LPH but unfortunately 
                                                 
15. I have chosen Sibree and Nisbet because they are typically the top two most frequently chosen 
translations: the former because it is comprehensive and classic; the latter because it is critical. 
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cannot read the world-historical survey, since Nisbet omits it. In picking just one 
translation, then, the student is necessarily going to miss out on one thing or the other. 
Therefore, we have to disagree to some extent with those who say that a similar reading 
is had whether one reads Nisbet or Sibree. To the introduction, Hoffmeister added almost 
one-third more material—not an insubstantial amount—all of which came from Hegel's 
own hand, better satisfying our criterion of authenticity. In this way, then, Nisbet's 
translation is more accessible than Sibree's translation of the Introduction. But if all one 
reads is the Introduction (whether Sibree's or Nisbet's translation), then one is likely 
neither to have benefited from the concretizing tonic of the world-historical survey nor, 
therefore, to have made the best access to Hegel. In failing our first criterion, then, the 
claim on trial needs a qualification.16 
 
The Criterion of Self-Containedness: Secondary Literature 
In this section, we will look at LPH commentaries by B. T. Wilkins, G. D. 
O'Brien, and Joseph McCarney, as well as miscellaneous secondary literature, in hopes of 
finding some sort of proof that the LPH is a self-contained work. We will also make this 
section larger than any other in this thesis just because the criterion of self-containedness 
is, I think, more intuitively proper as a criterion for accessibility than the other two. When 
                                                 
16. One may object that I have unnecessarily belabored my point and that only by extensive 
exegesis can it be satisfactorily demonstrated. Unfortunately, such a demonstration would increase the bulk 
of this thesis beyond acceptable bounds. Nonetheless, I think, the deficiencies of the textual tradition of the 
LPH are such that, even without such exegetical support, the claim on trial fails to meet my criterion of 
authenticity. On a separate but not unrelated note, see John McCumber, "On Teaching Hegel: Problems and 
Possibilities" in T. Kasachkoff (ed.) Teaching Philosophy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 171. 
He has opined that the greatest obstacle English-speaking students face in accessing Hegel is the fact that 
Hegel wrote in German, not English. Still worse, Hegel's German has been characterized as idiosyncratic, 
neologistic, and frequently given to wordplay and abstruse technicalities, potentially making the LPH, 
which is a mixture of the notes of both Hegel and his students', an even more remote work. So, although I 
hardly have the space in this paper to prove it exegetically, I am inclined to believe all the more that the 
LPH, maybe even all of Hegel's works, is exponentially more difficult to access than the others. 
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we find, then, that the LPH depends heavily on other works, and so, is not self-contained, 
it is not insignificant: accessibility thereby diminishes, and the claim of superior 
accessibility needs qualification. 
 
B.T. Wilkins, Hegel's Philosophy of History  
Burleigh T. Wilkins' interpretive work, Hegel's Philosophy of History, based on 
Hartman's English translation of the LPH, is among the first attempts to elucidate the 
LPH in the context of Hegel's overall system. In fact, however, Wilkins' aim is much 
narrower: he treats only of the Introduction to the LPH and seems to imply that Hegel's 
Science of Logic is fairly representative of Hegel's system.17 Wilkins focuses on the 
question with which Hegel himself seems to have been concerned in the Introduction to 
the LPH: what is the ultimate purpose of the world?18 Such methodological decisions are 
reasonable, for Wilkins is more interested in illuminating the LPH, mainly its 
Introduction, than in illuminating Hegel's greater system. 
More specifically, Wilkins' interpretation of the Introduction to the LPH proceeds 
in three chapters. In the first chapter, "The Varieties of History," Wilkins examines just 
the first few pages of the LPH's Introduction. Here, says Wilkins, Hegel self-consciously 
avoids an error that he sees made in much historical scholarship, and in allied disciplines, 
namely, that one can assume a passive posture in writing history such that the facts 
conferred by documents and artifacts organize themselves into categories and schemes 
                                                 
17. Wilkins, 13. Unfortunately, as points out, the Logic suffers from its own interpretive 
difficulties, even in relevant passages that Wilkins uses in interpreting the LPH (91). This, of course, only 
serves to render more difficult the task of determining Hegel's meaning in the LPH. 
18. Ibid., 13. 
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that allow the historian to produce an objective account of history.19 In avoiding this 
error, Hegel leads into a discussion of the different ways in which historians have done 
their work, identifying two general kinds of history: nonphilosophical history and 
philosophical history. Nonphilosophical history further divides into original history and 
reflective history, together receiving relatively sparse treatment in the LPH (ten pages or 
so) compared with the scores of pages of treatment that philosophical history receives. 
This disparity, Wilkins argues, is unfortunate, for understanding these few pages which 
treat of the movement from original history to philosophical history is crucial to the task 
of understanding Hegel's philosophy of history,20 the main tenet of which is that Reason 
is the one gift of philosophy to history, and that Reason in history proposes these two 
convictions: one, from the Greeks, that nature is ruled by universal physical laws; and, 
two, from the Christians, that God rules providentially over the world.21 With these 
convictions firmly in place, one can at once sympathize with a common reading of 
Hegel's philosophy of history, namely, that Hegel thinks that just as the correct 
mathematical or geometric concepts allow one to understand the natural, sensible world, 
so also the right historical concepts (e.g., a concept about God's Providence) allow one to 
understand history. Said differently, Hegel tries to reconcile teleology with mechanism, 
                                                 
19. Ibid., 19–26. The correction of this error, as Wilkins notes, is commonplace today; in Hegel's 
day, it was not. That Hegel is often construed as violating this very rule of which he was apparently very 
aware is ironic. If he did violate this rule, he either was, in fact, aware of the error but committed it anyway 
(for some ulterior purpose, perhaps) or so lacked the ability to self-criticize that he committed the error 
unconsciously. I am inclined toward neither option.  
20. Ibid., 28. The importance of Hegel's movement from original history to philosophical history 
has also been recognized by Duncan Forbes, "Introduction" in Nisbet, xvii, who argues that the movement 
is, in fact, a dialectical one.  
21. Wilkins, 47–48. 
Hegel and the LPH Myth 17 
the former being an understanding of purpose or design in the world and the latter being 
the understanding of its governance by physical laws.22  
As Wilkins sees it, this reading is problematic and can only be resolved with 
reference to Hegel's work outside the LPH. Expanding on this in the second chapter, 
"Teleology and Mechanism," and ever aware of Hegel's overarching question—"What is 
the ultimate purpose of the world?"—Wilkins broadens the tension between teleology 
and mechanism in more general terms of freedom and necessity.23 Wilkins does this, 
mimicking the section of Hegel's Logic that traces the development of mechanism, 
chemism, and teleology. Thus brought into the picture is Kant, whom Hegel sees, 
according to Wilkins, as failing to answer the only important, relevant question: is it 
teleology or mechanism, or, again, freedom or necessity, which has truth in itself? 
Hegel's solution in the Logic is that teleology is superior to mechanism, more 
specifically, that teleology cancels out in mechanism the negative while retaining the 
positive.24 Thus self-conscious individuals in the natural world are seen as "struggling"25 
to manifest the world's immanent purpose.26 After spending most of the chapter in 
exegesis of the relevant passages of the Logic, Wilkins returns to show the analogy 
between the dialectic of mechanism, chemism, and teleology in the Logic and that of 
                                                 
22. Ibid., 72–73. Correspondent to teleology and mechanism may be Hegel's concepts of Spirit 
and Nature. 
23. Ibid., 87–88. 
24. Ibid., 90–92. 
25. Ibid., 91. 
26. Ibid., 91–92. 
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original history, reflective history, and philosophical history in the LPH.27 He concludes 
that what philosophical history can do that no other kind of history can is this: the former, 
having become aware of the immanent purpose of the world, has established criteria by 
which to evaluate the empirical data used by all historians.28 
In the last chapter, Wilkins considers the section of the Logic that traces the 
development of possibility, actuality, and necessity. Giving it admittedly more selective 
treatment than thorough exposition, Wilkins says that Hegel views the concept of 
contingency in itself as an unsatisfactory reconciliation of possibility and actuality; 
instead, Hegel develops possibility and actuality into necessity. Thus, "what is really 
possible cannot be otherwise."29 But it is Hegel's view here of necessity which unsettles 
so many who read the LPH, wherein one reads of the cunning of reason, a notion which 
seems to justify all evil throughout history; of history itself described as the slaughter-
bench upon which is sacrificed happiness, wisdom, and freedom; and so on. Yes, but for 
Hegel, contingency itself, the tonic which the unsettled seek, is a necessary precondition 
in the development from possibility to necessity.30 As Hegel in the Logic cancels out the 
negative and retains the positive with respect to contingency and necessity, some sense is 
                                                 
27. Ibid., 121. It is worthwhile to mention here, like Wilkins, that the dialectic of self-
consciousness is relevantly analogous, too. That is, a man qua subject opposes, or estranges, himself, thus 
creating himself as an object in the natural order, and so, subject to mechanism, only to reconcile himself to 
himself with a more sophisticated self-awareness. As Wilkins, 132–133, notes in passing, Hegel is likely 
displaying this process in the world-historical survey of the LPH. 
28. Ibid., 134. 
29. Ibid., 151–152. Wilkins notes that Hegel himself is quick to qualify that what is really possible 
cannot be otherwise in particular conditions and circumstances. Per Wilkins, Hegel's claim amounts to 
this: that, for a particular phenomenon to occur, there are particular necessary and sufficient conditions 
which need to be in place such that, when they are, it necessarily follows that the phenomenon occurs 
(155–156). 
30. Ibid., 157–158. 
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made of Hegel's historical explanations in the LPH: Hegel's is primarily not a disdain for 
scientific explanations of history but rather an emphasis on the superiority of teleology, in 
general, and freedom, in specific.31  
The succinctness of this summary of Wilkins' work is not meant to betray the 
complex and sustained mental effort required to understand Wilkins' work, much less 
Hegel's. Rather, the summary serves two purposes. My first purpose is to procure 
appreciation for Wilkins' pioneering effort with the LPH. Though a less ambitious project 
than others since, his focused modesty gave his treatment greater explanatory potential; 
thus, one reviewer, while unsatisfied with Wilkins' theoretical treatment of teleology, can 
still praise Wilkins for correcting the misunderstandings of, e.g., W. H. Walsh and H. 
Marcuse.32 My second purpose is more directly relevant to the issue of the LPH's 
accessibility. While Wilkins may demonstrate that the LPH is self-contained enough to 
understand portions of it without recourse to other works, e.g., Hegel's initial discourse 
on the varieties of history, still, the LPH does little to illuminate Hegel's more formalized 
philosophy such as that in the Logic or Encyclopaedia.33 Moreover, one might, with 
Michael Zuckert, criticize Wilkins on the grounds that, excepting the first chapter which 
is almost entirely an isolated treatment of the text of the LPH, most of the book is an 
                                                 
31. Ibid., 186–190. Cf. also Robert Anchor, review of Hegel's Philosophy of History, by B. T. 
Wilkins, American Historical Review (June 1975): 611–612. 
32. H. S. Harris, review of Hegel's Philosophy of History, by B. T. Wilkins, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research (March 1975): 422. Walsh holds a view of the relation between Hegel's 
varieties of history with which Wilkins takes issue; Marcuse, as Wilkins sees it, misunderstands Hegel's 
'cunning of reason.' 
33. As if Hegel himself were not routinely impenetrable in thought, see Patrick Gardiner, review 
of Hegel's Philosophy of History, B. T. Wilkins, History and Theory (February 1976): 54–55. He says that 
Wilkins' treatment is sometimes equally impenetrable: Wilkins presents at once "a fair-minded and 
objective account of some of the things Hegel actually wrote about history . . . [H]owever . . . he is less 
successful when he goes on to try to illuminate Hegel's picture of historical development by relating it to 
the general doctrines . . . propounded in the Science of Logic and elsewhere." 
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exposition not of the LPH but of the Logic.34 With central tensions in the LPH resolved 
only in reference to other works, then, Wilkins' work gives us no reason to think the LPH 
is self-contained, and it is thus not without qualification Hegel's most accessible work. 
 
G. D. O'Brien, Hegel on Reason and History 
O'Brien's commentary on Hegel's philosophy of history builds indirectly upon the 
work of Wilkins. While there is overlap in the material covered (for instance, they both 
emphasize the dialectical development from original history to philosophical history), 
there is much contained in O'Brien that is not in Wilkins, this being in all likelihood the 
result of the influence of Alexander Kojève on O'Brien's work.35 More importantly and 
unlike Wilkins, O'Brien uses mainly Hoffmeister's 1955 critical edition, and he pays 
more attention to it. All of this makes O'Brien's work both complex and refreshing for the 
same reason: his assiduous exegesis of a more critical text.36 What this means for the task 
at hand, however, is that extended recapitulations of O'Brien's work cannot, for space 
limitations, be included here. Nonetheless, we will take shorter trips through the work 
just to be able to consider our question at hand in light of it. On first glance it would seem 
that O'Brien's work might vindicate the LPH as a fairly self-contained work, thus making 
it more accessible. In the end, however, we will not only see that this is not the case but 
also that O'Brien himself knows so. 
                                                 
34. Michael P. Zuckert, "Future of Hegel's Philosophy of History," review of Hegel's Philosophy 
of History, by B. T. Wilkins, Review of Politics (July 1977): 410. He also criticizes Wilkins for relying too 
heavily on English translations of Hegel's work, specifically on Hartman's translation of Karl Hegel's 
edition. See also John P. Burke, review of Hegel's Philosophy of History, by B. T. Wilkins, The 
Philosophical Review (April 1976): 261–264. Whether or not this greatly affects Wilkins' work is probably 
irrelevant. 
35. See O'Brien, 3, 8–9. For more on Kojève, see below. 
36. See also Zuckert, 409. 
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O'Brien begins with a summation of the status of the text of the LPH, not unlike 
my own above, though perhaps more thorough. In the second chapter, O'Brien lays the 
groundwork for understanding how Hegel viewed the philosophy of history. For O'Brien, 
Hegel sees philosophy of history neither as some speculative, a priori schema foisted 
upon the events of time nor as mere metahistorical criticism, a sort of philosophy of 
historiography. Rather, the philosophy of history results from the historian recognizing 
that all history-writing is an expression of man's self-consciousness at a given time and 
that only from this recognition can truly philosophical history be written.37 O'Brien's two 
main purposes in the third chapter are, one, to start discussion of Hegel's famous remark 
that Reason, philosophy's sole gift to history, objectively governs the world; and, two, to 
make the distinction that he sees implicit in Hegel between subjective and objective 
reason. He finishes this chapter by considering objective reason in light of Aristotle's four 
causes. Then the fourth chapter deals with subjective reason, and here O'Brien aims to 
resolve the tension between Hegel's remarks that philosophical historians "must proceed 
historically—empirically,"38 that Reason governs history, and that only through Reason 
can one comprehend history. Through extended interaction with, e.g., explanations and 
law in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Bertrand Russell's doctrine of knowledge by 
acquaintance, and Carl Hempel's covering-law model, O'Brien concludes that subjective 
Reason must be found in individuality, more specifically self-consciousness.39 For the 
fifth and sixth chapters, O'Brien uses Aristotle's four causes—end and efficient cause in 
                                                 
37. O'Brien, 35. 
38. Sibree, 10. 
39. Hence O'Brien's emphasis on the master-slave dialectic of the Phenomenology, for it is the 
self-consciousness of the slave and the master that puts the dialectic into motion.  
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chapter five, material and formal in chapter six—as the organizing principle underlying 
the LPH.40 Therefore, even though Hegel switches terms frequently, in general it can be 
said that the final cause of history is Spirit, the essence of which is freedom. Spirit is 
reached by means of human passions, the efficient cause. Spirit and human passions meet 
to form the matter of history: the State; and its constitution is history's formal cause.41 
The last chapter considers the lessons that, according to Hegel, can be learned from 
history, one of which is that in doing philosophical history, that is, in doing the sort of 
history that traces the development of the Absolute's self-consciousnesses of freedom, the 
historian is able to gain a sense of his own self-consciousness.42 It is particularly here that 
O'Brien does some of his most original and insightful thinking. 
 How then shall we think about O'Brien's work? To be sure, at certain points, it is 
something of an improvement upon Wilkins' work. O'Brien not only did close reading of 
the LPH, as is evidenced by the frequent block quotes and exegetical minutiae,43 but he 
also did not wander outside of the LPH as much as Wilkins did. Moreover, though 
O'Brien's argumentation, like Hegel's, is long and sophisticated, it is, unlike Hegel's, put 
forth perspicuously. Thus O'Brien illuminates with almost un-Hegelian clarity both 
Hegel's long dialectical movement from original history to philosophical history and the 
                                                 
40. While the organization of Hoffmeister's text of the Introduction to the LPH manifests, however 
vaguely, the four causes, O'Brien cites Kojève as the explicator from whom he borrows both the simile of 
history as a created edifice and the organizing principle of the four causes specifically in treating Hegel. 
O'Brien's contention is, of course, that Hegel was aware that he was organizing his 1830 lectures in this 
Aristotelian fashion (98–100). 
41. O'Brien, 101–102. 
42. Ibid., 164. 
43. Says Gardiner: "[O'Brien] makes a commendable effort to unravel sympathetically the 
complexities of the Hegelian texts" (56). 
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connection between philosophical history and Aristotle's four causes.44 If one had 
noticed, however, that Wilkins imported a great deal from the Logic to make cogent his 
interpretation of the LPH, one will probably notice, too, that O'Brien is similarly 
dependent on the Phenomenology, particularly its master-slave dialectic, which at critical 
points, says O'Brien, elucidates Hegel's understanding of self-consciousness in history. 
We may concede that this reliance upon the Phenomenology does not of itself necessitate 
a qualification that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work, because the Phenomenology 
is, after all, a central Hegel work. This by itself is not problematic, but when O'Brien 
explains the debt he owes to Alexander Kojève's famous lectures on the Phenomenology, 
it becomes problematic.45  
Why this is problematic may not be immediately clear, and though for space's 
sake we cannot afford to make it fully clear, we can at least mention the fact that there is 
little consensus as to the accuracy of Kojève's reading of the Phenomenology, and thus 
that, insofar as O'Brien's interpretation of the LPH depends on Kojéve's allegedly 
dubitable interpretation, it is subject to potentially fatal criticisms that warrant a 
qualification to the claim we are trying here. But consider the lack of consensus. Some 
have representatively dismissed Kojève's reading of the Phenomenology as "incredibly 
eccentric"46 and, though "broadly justified," "seriously incomplete."47 But it is P. T. Grier 
                                                 
44. Harris says that O'Brien's analysis "worked . . . out magnificently," "correctly," and 
"convincingly" (237). 
45. See Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 2d ed., trans. J. H. Nichols, Jr. 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1947; reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). 
46. Robert Pippin, Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 21. 
47. Michael Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1998), 248–249. See also Tom Rockmore, Before & After Hegel (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993), 
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who has more comprehensively called into question Kojève's reading, noting that, as 
Kojève also indicated, his interpretation of the Phenomenology, and particularly the 
master-slave dialectic, has no basis in the text itself, but rather that it came from and is 
based upon the work of Kojève's fellow Russian émigré scholar Alexandre Koyré, who 
based his reading of the Phenomenology upon some newly found early writings of 
Hegel's philosophy of nature.48 We cannot afford to look any closer into the issue, but the 
point we take as sufficiently established. If O'Brien bases, even in part, his interpretation 
of the LPH on Kojève's dubitable reading of the Phenomenology's master-slave dialectic, 
which may not be actually based on the text but rather on Koyré's interpretation of the 
Phenemenology in light of newly found writings of Hegel's earliest thoughts on the 
philosophy of nature, then we see more clearly on what unstable ground much of 
O'Brien's commentary stands. In the end, we have at least prima facie reason to qualify 
the claim that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work.49 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3. He echoes that Kojève "errs in taking a part [of Hegel] for the whole." McCarney points out the 
incompleteness of Kojève's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history, calling it "a kind of heroic 
generalisation" of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, and so concludes that "whatever brilliant insights or 
transforming perspectives [Kojève] may provide, they are unlikely to come with a panoply of textual 
references" (92). 
48. See P. T. Grier, "The End of History and the Return of History" in J. Stewart (ed.) Hegel 
Myths and Legends (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), passim. One may recall the similarity 
between a new interpretation of Hegel based on recently found, early writings, and that new interpretation 
of Marx offered by certain Marxist historians who made much of newly found early writings of Marx. 
49. If the reader is interested to give nuance to the relationship between O'Brien, Kojève, Koyré, et 
al., consult the following works: Grier; Kojève, 43–70; and O'Brien, 3, 8–9, 53, 57, 87, 90–91, 98–99, 105, 
122. For a more thorough assessment of O'Brien's debt to Kojève, see Zuckert, 410; Gardiner, 55–56; 
Harris, 428; Stanley Rosen, review of Hegel on Reason and History, by G. D. O'Brien, The American 
Political Science Review (September 1977), 1149); and Georg G. Iggers, review of Hegel on Reason and 
History, by G. D. O'Brien, American Historical Review (October 1976): 844. 
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Joseph McCarney, Hegel on History  
After Wilkins and O'Brien, little serious, comprehensive work had been done by a 
single scholar in the area of Hegel's philosophy of history. With the publication of Joseph 
McCarney's Hegel on History, all that changed.50 McCarney, like his predecessors, 
focuses his inquiry mainly on the Introduction to the LPH, though, unlike his 
predecessors, he makes a reasonable and more marked attempt to incorporate the lengthy 
world-historical survey inasmuch as it is useful to incarnate, so to speak, some of the 
abstractions made in the Introduction. Reasonable also is the structure of McCarney's 
inquiry: In the first part, he lays the philosophical foundations of Hegel's philosophy of 
history by defining and giving substance to the main metaphysical and historical concepts 
and ideas in the Introduction to the LPH; in the second part, the actual text of the LPH 
takes a more organizing and procedural lead, which McCarney follows; and between the 
two parts is an essay that attempts briefly to bridge the conceptual gap between the two 
parts. As McCarney hopes, the whole structure of the book reflects more clearly what he 
sees as the formal unity of the LPH. Ultimately, McCarney's aim is to illuminate not only 
the basic ideas and concepts of the LPH but also those things which Hegel had to 
presuppose in order to unfold his philosophy of history in the LPH.51 To accomplish this, 
McCarney says that he must without question go outside the LPH to Hegel's other 
works.52 In other words, the LPH is not an entirely self-contained work and a reader who 
                                                 
50. Because this work is relatively recent, there has been little scholarly, peer-reviewed criticism 
of it. See Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 336. There he briefly mentions the work, 
among other books, as a good starting point for those interested in Hegel's philosophy of history. 
51. McCarney, 6. He aims also to justify these presuppositions. Whether or not he is successful in 
doing so is an inquiry for another paper. 
52. Ibid., 19. 
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wishes to understand even the basics of the LPH must go outside it to do so. While this 
admission on the part of McCarney could suffice for our purposes, a glance at the content 
of his work will substantiate the need to qualify the claim at hand.  
 A survey of McCarney's ideas sufficiently long for our purposes would run 
something like this. In part one, McCarney enlists the basic terms that Hegel regularly 
uses in the LPH that, if left undefined, McCarney thinks, will at best confuse and at worst 
mislead the reader. This list includes terms like "reason," "the Idea," "God," "concept," 
and "Spirit"—terms which one may take to mean one thing when Hegel meant something 
different or, as McCarney thinks, even completely opposite. Therefore, to explain the 
development of self-consciousness, McCarney quotes long, dense passages from the 
Phenomenology;53 to explain the unity of infinite and finite in the divine and human 
nature, McCarney references Hegel's Encyclopaedia;54 to show the transition from the 
concept of Spirit to that of Nature, he goes to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature;55 to define 
Hegel's "concept," it is back to the Phenomenology;56 and to plump the emaciated 
concept of Geist in the LPH, McCarney returns to the Encyclopaedia, where Geist is 
given nourished consideration.57 McCarney even later shows how important it is to 
understand Kant, and Hegel's criticisms of him, in order to understand Hegel's thoughts 
                                                 
53. Ibid., 26–32. 
54. Ibid., 46–47. 
55. Ibid., 49–50. 
56. Ibid., 53. 
57. Ibid., 62–64. 
Hegel and the LPH Myth 27 
on historical teleology58 and related notions like the cunning of reason59 and the ethical 
life.60  
Almost the entire book follows this pattern of identifying concepts, defining them 
fully using as much other work of Hegel as is needed, then returning to the LPH with a 
fuller understanding of its conceptual framework. The result is new-found clarity and 
orderliness in the LPH, and while this result is great for the LPH reader, it also proves my 
point about the necessity of going outside the LPH in order to make it understandable. As 
for McCarney, he sees himself as simply taking seriously Hegel's own prefatory 
comments to his lectures, which in effect state that all along more information than the 
LPH provides has been needed to understand the LPH.61 McCarney thus concludes that, 
apparently, "some vital preliminaries to the action of the Introduction have already taken 
place off-stage."62 This prima facie justifies McCarney in wandering "off-stage." 
 McCarney's method is, however, a Faustian bargain: for though McCarney's use 
of the Phenomenology, the Encyclopaedia, etc. helps to clarify some of the abstruse 
concepts that are presupposed in the LPH, it also necessarily readmits, as McCarney is 
aware, at least one of the most intractable and age-old debates in Hegel interpretation, 
namely, does Hegel see the substance of Reason as ruling over the world as an immanent 
                                                 
58. Ibid., 127–129. The relevant criticisms of Kant are contained in the Encyclopaedia. 
59. Ibid., 133. Here McCarney goes to the Logic. 
60. Ibid., 159. 'Ethical life' translates Hegel's term Sittlichkeit. 
61. Thus Hegel says of the LPH: "I have no text book on which to base my lectures; but in my 
'Elements of the Philosophy of Right' . . . I have already defined the concept of world history proper, as 
well as the principles or periods into which its study can be divided. This work should enable you to gain at 
least an abstract knowledge of those moments of world history with which we shall be concerned here" 
(Nisbet, 11). Cf. also McCarney, 6. 
62. McCarney, 26. 
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or transcendent power?63 This question can be reframed as construing this power as deity: 
is God64 an autonomous being independent of nature that rules over the historical realm? 
This reading would be something closer to traditional theism. Or is God immanent in 
nature, distinct, perhaps, but not separate from the world in which we live? Such a notion 
of deity is noticeably pantheistic. McCarney accepts this immanent reading, and most of 
the book is spent vindicating that reading, though he admits, at least on one occasion,65 
that the transcendent reading appears more correct than the immanent one. That this 
debate has been around since the first generation of Hegel interpreters and shows no signs 
of abating in our own time, and that both sides of the debate have been able to 
corroborate their reading with references to the Hegel corpus shows, at the very least, that 
the navigability of this debate is deeply textual. But the problem that this debate brings to 
the LPH is further compounded upon consideration of the situation in which Hegel found 
himself in Berlin and how this may have affected his public teaching. As McCarney 
contends, Hegel might have been intentionally ambiguous on this issue to avoid Berlin 
censorship. The reason for this behavior is clear and not incidentally favors McCarney's 
immanent reading: for Hegel to teach an arrant immanentism would be to lay himself 
open to the charge of pantheism, a view quite in conflict with traditional Christian theism, 
and to invite the censorship of the Berlin powers that be. But if Hegel believed in the 
                                                 
63. Ibid., 39–48, passim. Says McCarney: "No progress can be made in explicating that 
philosophy [of history] without declaring, and attempting to vindicate, where one stands on the issues at 
stake in [the debate between immanent and transcendent readings]. This is a nettle that simply has to be 
grasped" (40). If he is right, this debate captures in a snapshot the very delicate nature of Hegel 
interpretation, particularly as regards his LPH.   
64. Whether Hegel meant "God" in any traditional sense of the term is debated heavily. See 
McCarney, 40.  
65. See ibid., 124–126. 
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traditional theistic notion of a transcendent deity, the apparent ambiguity becomes, as 
McCarney reasons, inexplicable.66 This attempt to historicize Hegel is commendable67 
but, of course, indecisive in the final analysis. Nonetheless, it demonstrates well the 
thorniness of Hegel interpretation. Whether, in the end, McCarney is right to incorporate 
these nettling issues into his account of the LPH is not our business here; we are 
concerned only to show that LPH commentators again and again feel compelled to have 
recourse to works other than the LPH for explanatory purposes. We can now take it as 
established that McCarney, perhaps more than most LPH interpreters, recognizes this. 
 
Miscellaneous Works on the LPH 
We have looked at three of the leading commentaries and interpretations on the 
LPH and concluded confidently that there is an established pattern of venturing outside 
the LPH to the Phenomenology, the Logic, the Encyclopaedia, and other works in order 
to render intelligible the claims and arguments in the LPH.68 A quick glance at Hegel 
scholarship that does not focus exclusively on the LPH will show just the same thing. 
 Consider, for example, the following. In one essay, Frederick Beiser comments on 
the importance of history and historicism for Hegel's philosophy, noting further that 
Hegel's historical methodology is treated at length only in the LPH.69 Beiser argues, 
                                                 
66. Ibid., 42–44. 
67. In fact, Beiser sees the need to individuate Hegel historically as one of the most pressing needs 
of current Hegel scholarship. See Hegel, 5. 
68. Other LPH commentaries and interpretations were found and consulted but, in the end, not 
commented upon in this thesis, if only because they appeared somewhat narrower in scope and never 
appeared to gain any scholarly currency. E.g., see R. J. Siebert, Hegel's Philosophy of History: Theological, 
Humanistic, and Scientific Elements (Lewiston, Edwin Mellen: 1979); and William A. Behun, The 
Historical Pivot: Philosophy of History in Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin (Zion: Triad Press, 2006). 
69. "Hegel's Historicism," in F. C. Beiser (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 270–300. 
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however, that to understand that method it is necessary to look at texts beside the LPH. 
As for Beiser, he goes to the Phenomenology.70 In his important volume, Walter 
Kauffmann claims that in general a knowledge of Hegel's overall system and in specific a 
knowledge of Hegel's philosophy of aesthetics and of religion are needed to properly 
contextualize the LPH and to dispel the "many misconceptions about his philosophy of 
history and of the state."71 In his seminal comprehensive volume on Hegel, J. N. Findlay 
makes the LPH unquestionably dependent on Hegel's philosophy of right, being 
particularly subservient to Hegel's political theory of the state.72 In his introductory essay 
to the Nisbet translation of the Hoffmeister text of the LPH, Duncan Forbes also uses the 
Philosophy of Right to bolster his analysis of Hegel's dialectical movement from original 
history to philosophical history.73 Finally, in Jean Hyppolite's Introduction to Hegel's 
Philosophy of History, though the subject at hand is ostensibly Hegel's philosophy of 
history, the actual text is only rarely cited and instead treated almost strictly through the 
Phenomenology or, in rare cases, the Philosophy of Right and Hegel's early theological 
                                                 
70. Beiser, Hegel's Historicism, 284. Another example from Beiser's article: in discerning what 
type of teleology Hegel is dealing with in the LPH, Beiser warns that "Hegel's language here can be 
extremely misleading. If, however, we consider Hegel's remarks in the light of his other works, it becomes 
clear that the kind of teleology in question is not that commonplace in the eighteenth century" (288–289, 
emphasis mine). If one had been aware of Hegel's commitment to the Aristotelian dictum that universals 
only exist in re, made explicit in Hegel's Encyclopaedia, then Hegel's musings on the teleology of Geist in 
the LPH would not have been as confusing. 
71. Hegel: A Reinterpretation (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), 270. Kaufmann also emphasizes 
Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy as a high point of Hegel's philosophy in general (275). 
72. Hegel: A Re-examination (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), 328–333. Findlay says 
specifically: "This Philosophy of History is no independent part of the system, which can be studied in 
isolation" (238). 
73. "Introduction" in Nisbet, vii–xxxv. Of the LPH, Forbes says: "it is liable to be used as a 
substitute rather than an introduction [to Hegel], especially as a substitute for the Philosophy of Right, and 
one suspects that much of the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Hegel has been due to this" (vii). 
Hegel and the LPH Myth 31 
writings.74 In his book Freedom and Tradition in Hegel, Thomas Lewis is concerned that 
ignorance of critical distinctions made only outside the LPH will lead uninformed readers 
of the LPH to think that its ideas are irrational or unjust.75  
Though the list could go on, the point can be taken as established: just as those 
commentators whose work focuses comprehensively and strictly on the LPH are 
routinely compelled to explain the arcane concepts and ideas of the LPH with reference 
to other works, so also do those scholars whose work has narrower scope or does not 
focus strictly on the LPH. All of this is indicative of the fact that the LPH is not a self-
contained work, and to the extent that it is not so, it is not an accessible work. We look 
now to the still broader aspect of wider Hegel scholarship in hopes of finding better 
points of entrée than the LPH so as to warrant a qualification for the claim in question. 
 
The Criterion of Navigability: Wider Hegel scholarship 
 
As was said, this final aspect under consideration is broader than that of the 
variegated text of the LPH itself and of the LPH's secondary literature. In the first case, 
we saw how the heterogeneity of the various versions of the LPH text detracted from its 
authenticity as we defined it as a criterion of accessibility. In the second case, we noted 
the tendency in the secondary literature of the LPH to require the help of works other 
than the LPH in order to explain basic concepts and ideas in the LPH, thereby 
diminishing its self-containedness as we defined it as a criterion of accessibility. In this 
                                                 
74. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996). 
His use of the Phenomenology can be seen throughout the work. For examples of his use of the Philosophy 
of Right, cf. 56–70, passim; and of Hegel's youthful writings, cf. 20–25. 
75. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2005). Says Lewis: "It is essential to distinguish 
Hegel's claim about the rationality of the ways of life of particular nations—a claim we might reject—from 
his analysis of individuals' relations to these ways of life" (146). 
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last aspect, we will glance at the greater corpus of Hegel scholarship just far enough to 
demonstrate some of the basic contours of current Hegel scholarship. What we will find 
is that Hegel presents one of the most formidable interpretive challenges in philosophy, 
and therefore lack of consensus characterizes Hegel scholarship. For an incoming Hegel 
student, this challenge can be (and perhaps should be) bewildering and mystifying, 
making it difficult to navigate any further. For our purposes, note here that navigability is 
closely related to accessibility, and so we can construe the problem thus: one of the first 
tasks to undertake after making an entrance into a philosopher's thought is to orient 
oneself and proceed. Given Hegel's labyrinthine thought, the choice of entrance is crucial. 
To choose a substandard entrance is to exacerbate the task of subsequently orienting 
oneself. To choose a better entrance, however, quite naturally is to make the task of 
navigating thereafter somewhat easier, even if the waters, so to speak, are still quite 
tumultuous. Thus in looking at this third and final aspect, that of the greater corpus of 
secondary literature on Hegel, we will find that the lack of interpretive consensus creates 
a situation in which entering Hegel's thought through the LPH may leave the reader so 
disoriented that finding one's bearings becomes a most difficult task, thereby making it at 
the very least reasonable to qualify the claim that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible 
work. To make the present task more manageable, we must limit ourselves to just one 
aspect of current Hegel scholarship: Hegel's metaphysics. 
Hegel's metaphysics is arguably the most controversial part of his philosophy. 
Virtually no consensus exists on what exactly he means with the stock metaphysical 
phrases he regularly uses throughout his corpus. Some sort of comprehensive survey of 
the varying interpretations is, perhaps for anyone, too grand an undertaking, but 
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especially so for our purposes, so, given the limited space we have here, we will instead 
limit ourselves to just three broad interpretations: the historical-traditional metaphysical 
reading, the non-metaphysical reading, and, quite fittingly, a reading which accepts and 
denies differing tenets in the previous two.  
First, the historical-traditional metaphysical reading: This view was favored 
among Hegel's earliest interpreters.76 For these, Hegel seemed to have posited, in a pre-
critical, dogmatic, even Leibnizian-Wolffian manner, a thoroughly speculative 
metaphysics, one which must be jettisoned if Hegel is to be of any use. Thus Dilthey, for 
example, tries to free Hegel's insight into the philosophy of history from those seemingly 
dubious metaphysical claims about "Reason governing history" or "the Idea advancing to 
infinite antithesis."77 Twentieth-century examples of this reading also exist, which, 
having dispensed with Hegel's speculative metaphysics, either retain some appealing 
aspect of his system or reject Hegel with varying degrees of finality. An example of the 
former would be Benedetto Croce, who wished to preserve the dialectic and its gifts 
while refuting "all panlogism and every speculative construction."78 An example of the 
latter would be Karl Popper, who declared that the same dialectic has "lost in our day 
together with Hegelianism any significance" and is nothing "more than a clever joke . . . 
revealing the weakness of . . . speculations."79 Examples of both sorts could be 
                                                 
76. Frederick Beiser, "Introduction: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics" in F. C. Beiser (ed.) 
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2. He names 
Dilthey, Haym, Haering, Rosenkranz, and Kroner among such early interpreters. 
77. See Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 538. These quotes 
are paraphrased from Sibree, 9, 26. 
78. Benedetto Croce, What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1985), 203. 
79. Karl Popper, "What is Dialectic?" Mind (October 1940): 426. 
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multiplied, for most in the Marxist and Anglo-American analytic tradition who have 
bothered with Hegel at all have come to similar conclusions regarding him.80  
Second, the non-metaphysical reading: this view rejects the historical-traditional 
metaphysical reading of Hegel as lacking in textual support and offers in its stead a 
reading that leaves Hegel with a much more modest metaphysical program, i.e., one with 
noticeably fewer metaphysical commitments. Though embryonic forms of this reading 
can be found in earlier Hegel interpretations, it was posited most succinctly and seminally 
by Klaus Hartmann.81 For him, Hegel was caught up in the task of giving the Real its 
determination in a way that was rationally satisfactory.82 From the text of the Logic and 
the Encyclopaedia, Hartmann finds no trace of dogmatic metaphysics in Hegel but rather 
identifies Hegel's philosophy with a theory of categories, where these categories 
determine the way in which reality is understood.83 Thus reason tries to give an account 
of its categories in an effort to satisfy itself on its own immanent, reflective terms. If it is 
not satisfied, a process of categorial reconstruction occurs until reason is satisfied.84 
Recently, this view has gained marked currency, and several of Hartmann's students have 
introduced this reading to a new generation of Hegel scholarship. Two of these 
students—H. T. Engelhardt, Jr. and Terry Pinkard—have played particularly prominent 
                                                 
80. In this context, see Allen W. Wood, "Hegel and Marxism" in F. C. Beiser (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Hegel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 415. He mentions J.-P. Sartre and T. 
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Hegel (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972): 101–124. 
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83. Ibid., 104.  
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roles, both in clarifying Hartmann's original ideas as well as exploring their implications. 
Thus, says Englehardt, Hartmann was trying to avoid the historical-traditional view of 
Hegel's metaphysics as well as the type of non-metaphysical reading where Hegel was 
just the propagator of a new ironist tradition in Western philosophy (à la Rorty). Taking 
the via media, Hartmann read Hegel's metaphysics as "the immanent rationale of a 
categorial hermeneutic."85 Pinkard, too, retained much of the influence of Hartmann's 
non-metaphysical reading, publishing one work on Hegel's dialectic.86 Robert Pippin, 
though not a student of Hartmann, showed the influence of a non-metaphysical reading in 
his influential Hegel's Idealism.87 In it, Pippin supports a form of a non-metaphysical 
reading of Hegel, though one that is not a theory of categories. Instead, Pippin sees Hegel 
as a proponent of a specific kind of idealism that is neither speculative nor transcendental 
but rather a variation on the Kantian theme of the transcendental unity of apperception.88 
The relationship between Kant and Hegel is centerstage, then, for Pippin, whose task is to 
reconcile the facts, as Pippin posits them, that Hegel accepted Kant's strictures on 
metaphysics, that Hegel denied Kant's epistemological concept-intuition dualism, and 
that Hegel could still make a non-dogmatic claim to know the Absolute.89 Whether or not 
Pippin is successful in reconciling these facts is not our business here, but at any rate 
                                                 
85. H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., "Introduction" in H. T. Englehardt and T. Pinkard (eds.) Hegel 
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Pippin's work is important for its influence on other non-metaphysical interpreters such 
as Pinkard, who in one book notes Pippin as a tonic influence in his grasp of Hegel.90  
Some, however, found even these variations on the non-metaphysical reading of 
Hegel to be ultimately unsatisfactory. Representing the third view of Hegel's metaphysics 
is Frederick Beiser. Like Pippin and others, Beiser tries to navigate between the Scylla of 
the traditional-historical approach that views Hegel as the best example of everything 
wrong with speculative metaphysics and the Charybdis of that approach that strips Hegel 
of all metaphysical content, leaving only a pith that is Marxist, positivistic, humanistic, 
neo-Kantian, social epistemological, or categorical-analytical.91  But Beiser's results are 
noticeably different from Pippin and others. A proper understanding of Hegel's 
metaphysics, Beiser explains, must be seen in the historical context not only of Kant's 
philosophy but also of Fichte's and Schelling's, lest Hegel, forever philosophizing about 
the Absolute, be interpreted as being merely dogmatic. For Beiser, Hegel neither 
capitulated completely to Kant's limitations nor accepted Fichte's or Schelling's responses 
to Kant uncreatively; instead, Hegel modified Schelling's definition of the Absolute to 
include not only that which exists in and of itself but also "the whole of substance and its 
modes, as the unity of the infinite and the finite."92 And a system in which both the one 
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Hegel and the LPH Myth 37 
substance and its modes are unified is, for Hegel, a monistic naturalism.93 But Hegel's 
naturalism, unlike the mechanistic naturalism of Spinoza, views the natural world as 
organicist, vitalistic, and as necessitating the reintroduction of teleology. Now for Kant, 
to know rationally that nature is an organism is ruled out in his third Critique, but for 
Hegel, it is not. This not only shows one difference between Kant and Hegel, but it also 
makes clear what Hegel's critical task is, namely, to show that he can have rational 
knowledge of the Absolute, that nature is an organism. The attempts to show this by 
Fichte and Schelling Hegel rejects, and his last recourse, says Beiser, is also his most 
original: the dialectic. The dialectic is meant to "show the possibility, indeed the 
necessity, of a strictly immanent metaphysics based upon experience alone."94 
Not only is Beiser's foregoing account at least as explanatory, if not more so, than 
the other possibilities; it is also an impressive demonstration of two things. One, it 
demonstrates the need to historicize Hegel so as to individuate him among his German 
idealist contemporaries. Two, it demonstrates how failure to historicize and individuate 
Hegel can negatively affect one's interpretation of Hegel. And if the issue of Hegel's 
metaphysics is at all representative of the heterogeneity of interpretation that typifies 
Hegel scholarship, then what it means to access Hegel, and what role the LPH might play 
in accessing him, surely requires re-evaluation. To claim that the LPH is Hegel's most 
accessible work seems more problematic now than ever. A qualification is in order.95  
                                                 
93. Thus explaining his emphasis on his Naturphilosophie. 
94. Ibid., 21.  
95. A qualification is in order indeed, I think, when one more deeply considers also Hegel's 
German idealist milieu. For quite some time and especially among Anglo-American philosophers, German 
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Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper, I set out to evaluate the claim that the LPH is Hegel's most 
accessible work. My thesis is that the claim is in need of serious qualifying. I argued this, 
first, by setting up three basic criteria of accessibility—authenticity, self-containedness, 
and navigability—and, second, by showing how the LPH fails in some measure to meet 
each of those criteria. I did this mainly by considering the text of the LPH itself, the 
secondary literature on the LPH, and the wider corpus of Hegel scholarship.  
With respect to the text itself, we discovered that its long and variegated career, 
both in its German and English editions, is reason enough to doubt how representative of 
Hegel's thought the LPH truly is. Though Hegel's lectures include a relatively abstract 
Introduction and a lengthy world-historical survey from ancient China to modern 
Christendom, often translators would only translate the Introduction. Moreover, 
subsequent editions of the Introduction took an increasingly text-critical approach that 
rendered the earlier, but still widely-circulated, editions of the Introduction inferior, while 
also exposing their organizational and interpretive flaws.  
                                                                                                                                                 
that they had, in one way or another, abandoned Kant's critical philosophy and returned to pre-critical, 
dogmatic speculative metaphysics. It is this reductionistic, withered view of German idealism, common in 
Anglo-American circles, that has been redressed by the burgeoning, recent literature in English. One such 
example is Frederick Beiser's The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), in which he retraces the reception of Kant's philosophy up to Fichte, a 
grasp of which sets in relief the rising tensions of the Enlightenment and provides a framework in which 
the German idealists can be seen, not as reverting to pre-critical dogmatism, but as responding to those 
tensions. The advent of such seminal scholarship leads one to wonder how clear the picture of Hegel has 
been that English-speaking students have been looking at. If just Beiser's account shows anything of the 
clarity and depth that can be had as a result of situating Hegel in his historical context, then a re-
examination of how best to navigate Hegel's philosophy may be warranted; and if so, then we have a prima 
facie reason to believe that the claim on trial needs qualifying. For other examples of the recent English 
language literature, consult Karl Ameriks, ed., The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against 
Subjectivism, 1781–1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Deiter Henrich, Between Kant and 
Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); and Terry Pinkard, 
German Philosophy, 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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With respect to the secondary literature, we looked deep into three comprehensive 
interpretations of Hegel's LPH—Wilkins', O'Brien's, and McCarney's—as well as some 
other secondary treatments of the LPH. In doing so, we discovered a pattern among these 
commentaries, namely, the need to go outside the LPH to other works by Hegel or others 
in order to understand even some of the basic content of the LPH. This pattern militates 
against the self-containedness of the LPH and so it fails in some measure to meet that 
criterion of accessibility, at least enough to warrant a qualification of the claim that the 
LPH is Hegel's most accessible work.  
Lastly, with respect to the wider corpus of Hegel scholarship, we looked at just 
one specific issue—Hegel's metaphysics—just long enough to see whether, after reading 
the LPH, a student would be more oriented or disoriented in continuing his or her study 
of Hegel. Once we noted the variety of interpretations of Hegel's metaphysics, we 
concluded that the LPH fails to meet satisfactorily this criterion of navigability. All 
together, the verdict is that the LPH fails to meet all three criteria, and the claim is 
sentenced to thorough qualification.  
 But what would this qualification look like? After all, if not the LPH, what is 
Hegel's most accessible work, especially considering that most scholars regularly 
comment on Hegel's strange vocabulary and dense construction? Unfortunately, it is not 
the province of this paper to answer that question. It may be the LPH; it may not be. But 
we have shown that the unqualified claim that the LPH is, in fact, Hegel's most accessible 
work is problematic three times over. That said, I suggest that the qualification be 
articulated as in a manner that corresponds to my criteria of accessibility. 
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Now one may object that perhaps all of this has been a little overwrought. Could 
not it have been, merely and still reasonably, asserted that such a claim is in need of some 
qualification? Did we really need all this research to persuade those who persist in 
claiming that the LPH is Hegel's most accessible work that they are wrong? This 
objection is not really an objection, but perhaps an evaluation of the work I have here 
done, namely, that it has proved too little. To demonstrate that the LPH is not Hegel's 
most accessible work by, for example, referencing the various and differing 
interpretations found in LPH commentaries does nothing more than explain the purpose 
of commentaries: to use other texts to illuminate a given text. I take this objector-cum-
evaluator's point. Perhaps I have proved only a little, but this is not an objection to my 
conclusion. That the LPH is regularly extolled as Hegel's most accessible work, to me, 
seems to have reached mythic proportions, and to demythologize the myth by adding 
even some minor qualifications will, I hope, redress the unqualified, misleading claim.  
 Another objection that might be put forward here is that, according to the criteria 
of accessibility put in place above, most philosophical works from all Western 
philosophical history would be rendered inaccessible. Is it possible that such criteria, 
though admittedly self-styled, are a little too stringent and demanding and that perhaps 
they ought to be relaxed a little? Well, I am not at all inclined to believe that my criteria 
render most Western philosophical works inaccessible, though this objection could only 
be substantiated with individual studies. Perhaps the criteria need relaxing just a little, but 
not too much, because they seem, at least to me at any rate, intuitively apt, and I cannot 
imagine how they could be retooled without losing that intuitiveness. Unfortunately, such 
methodological concerns as accessing a thinker's thought have been given little treatment 
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in scholarly circles. If this lacuna were to be redressed and criteria of accessibility given 
greater nuance, then this objection, viz., that my criteria are somehow too demanding, 
might gain force. But even if the objection does gain force, I am inclined to believe that 
my main point will still stand. After all, I have not been interested to show to what degree 
the LPH failed to meet my criteria (for this would indeed require nuance), but rather only 
that it did and that therefore the claim needed qualification. Whether my criteria are 
impregnable to nuanced objections matters little. So long as they remain somewhat 
intuitive, my argument should still stand. 
 It seems that the most apt conclusion overall would be to be mystified at how 
difficult it is to access Hegel at all. If my work has accomplished anything, hopefully it 
will serve to teach just this. Perhaps by one generation of Hegel scholarship showing the 
next one how difficult it is to access Hegel, then that next generation will know more 
exactly what it is that they are getting into when approaching Hegel and his LPH. And if 
they know that sufficiently, we, having set the bar at what may seem at times an 
unreachable height, may have, at least in part, guaranteed the quality of the Hegel 
scholarship of the next generation.
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